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ABSTRACT 
It is a widely held view that imperfect capital markets mean that individuals from poor 
backgrounds cannot borrow in order to finance educational investments. This view 
pervades policy formation, and is reflected in the fact that post-compulsory education 
processes in all countries involve considerable government intervention and large public 
subsidies.  But are the existence of credit constraints an empirical reality? 
This paper uses unique data to take a new approach to this question. Specifically, the 
1995 Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP) allows us to explore the financial 
resources and skill formation choices of a large number of recent job losers. This 
approach has several advantages, including: a direct test of the role of finances in 
determining training; the availability of considerable information concerning individual 
histories; and the fact that the unemployed are a particularly apposite group with which 
to explore the questions of credit constraints.  
We find that credit constraints do appear to limit the human capital investments of a 
significant minority of job seekers. In particular, controlling for a broad range of 
background characteristics (including past educational investments and labour market 
outcomes), the possession of liquid assets at the time of job loss is strongly associated 
with subsequent self-financed training. This basic finding is corroborated with several 
different kinds of evidence drawn from the survey. The data also allow us to make a 
rough estimate of the extent to which participation in training would have been 
increased, had no part of our sample been credit constrained. 
  
1 
Credit Constraints and Training after Job Loss 





It is a widely held view that imperfect capital markets mean that individuals from poor 
backgrounds cannot borrow in order to finance educational investments. This view pervades 
policy formation, and is reflected in the fact that post-compulsory education processes in all 
countries involve considerable government intervention and large public subsidies.   
The evidence that credit constraints limit human capital investments is controversial.  
It is largely indirect or inferential, based, for example, on observed correlations between 
family income and the pursuit of post-secondary education. Other researchers have challenged 
the conclusions of such studies on several grounds.  A balanced view may be that the 
importance of credit constraints to training and education choices is not yet resolved.   
This paper uses unique data to take a new approach to this question. Specifically, the 
1995 Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP) allows us to explore the financial resources 
and skill formation choices of a large number of recent job losers. This approach has three 
advantages.   
First, it is a fairly direct investigation of the role of credit constraints. We have good 
measures of the financial resources of our subjects, in particular a measure of liquid assets or 
“cash-on-hand”, and we can relate this to the contemporaneous training and education choices 
of the same individuals while controlling for a rich set of individual and household 
characteristics.    
Second, because job losers have labor market histories, we can use past labor market 
outcomes to control for heterogeneity in abilities and other unobservables that are likely to 
affect human capital investments. Failure to control for such “long run factors” is an 
important criticism of the earlier literature on parents’ incomes and their children’s college 
choices (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the unemployed are a group that are more 
likely to face credit constraints than the general population.  Employment is a key lending 
criteria for many financial institutions. Job loss is, for some, an unanticipated (or at least not 
fully anticipated) shock. In contrast, the arrival of children at college age may be a well 
anticipated life-cycle event (see Souleles, 2000). The many public sector-sponsored training 
programs targeted the unemployed surely reflect the view that they are a group that is likely to  
2 
be credit constrained. Thus, the possible role of credit constraints in limiting the training 
choices of the recent job losers is of particular interest.  
Moreover, if we are unable to find evidence that credit constraints limit the human 
capital investments of recent job losers, then one might infer that it is unlikely that such 
constraints are important for more advantaged groups. Studying groups such as the 
unemployed, for whom the issue is likely to be most important, seems a natural place to focus 
research effort. 
In our analysis we distinguish between training after job loss that is largely paid for by 
government, unions or former employers, and “self-financed” training in which the worker or 
his or her household paid a significant out-of-pocket cost. We hypothesize that the latter 
activity may be particularly sensitive to credit constraints, because the marginal value of 
current outlays is high for credit constrained households. Moreover, training investments in 
which the worker paid an out of pocket cost (and presumably had greater discretion over the 
type of training and provider) are of additional interest in light of the many programs 
involving vouchers or subsidized educational savings accounts that are being developed and 
tested around the world.
1   Self-financed training among job losers has largely been ignored 
by the literature, except as a nuisance (`substitution bias’) that confounds attempts to evaluate 
government programs (Kane and Rouse, 2000; Heckman, Hohmann and Smith, 2000). As far 
as we are aware, this study is unique in making self-financed training the object of central 
interest, and in focussing on credit constraints and training among the unemployed. 
We find that credit constraints do appear to limit the human capital investments of a 
significant minority of job seekers. In particular, controlling for a broad range of background 
characteristics (including past educational investments and labor market outcomes), the 
possession of liquid assets at the time of job loss is strongly associated with subsequent self-
financed training. This basic finding is corroborated with several different kinds of evidence 
drawn from the survey. The data also allow us to make a rough estimate of the extent to 
which participation in training would have been increased, had no part of our sample been 
credit constrained.  
 
I. Literature   
There is a large literature that deals with the extent and consequences of credit 
constraints.
2 Here we review only the two areas of research which are most relevant for the  
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current study: the evidence that credit constraints limit investments in human capital, and 
recent research on whether the unemployed are credit constrained.   
 
A.   Credit Constraints and Human Capital Investment 
A number of different empirical relationships have been interpreted as evidence that 
limited access to credit constrains human capital investment.  First, there is substantial 
evidence establishing a correlation between family income and college choices. The argument 
is then made that if there are no borrowing constraints to finance skill investments, there 
should also be no relationship between family income and an individual’s level of education. 
This interpretation has been criticized on the grounds that there is a likely association between 
family income and a plethora of factors associated with educational choice. These include the 
quality of compulsory schooling, inherent ability, educational motivation and values 
regarding education that are transferred between parents and children.  
Carneiro and Heckman (2002)  make the point that long-run environmental and family 
factors are likely to be critical determinants of a young person’s interest in and capacity for 
college education, and provide evidence that family income is not correlated with college 
attendance given proper control for individuals’ educational abilities (as proxied by test 
scores).  Using a range of different approaches to isolate the effect of family income net of 
such long run factors, Cameron and Taber (2000) reach the same conclusion: there is 
apparently no relationship between family income and educational outcomes.   
A second empirical observation is that there are differences in rates of return to 
education across groups. Card (2000) suggests that those from poor backgrounds receive 
relatively high returns to college education. One interpretation of this finding is that those 
from poor backgrounds are credit constrained and so under-invest in college, and this results 
in relatively high rates of return (Kane and Rouse, 1999). 
Kane and Rouse also provide evidence that increases in tuition costs have a much 
bigger impact on the educational choices of the poor than (properly discounted) increases in 
the relative wages of graduates. They interpret these findings as evidence for the existence of 
credit constraints.   
Cameron and Heckman (1999, 2001) challenge the credit constraint interpretation of 
these findings. In particular, they report that when ability is controlled for in college 
enrolment equations (by introducing test scores) the responsiveness of persons from low 
income families to tuition is reduced, and the differences across groups in rates of return are  
4 
eliminated. Also, Altonji and Dunn (1996) find no evidence that returns to education vary 
systematically with family income.   
It is also worth noting (as Cameron and Taber, and Carneiro and Heckman, have done) 
that empirical tests of the effects of tuition changes and of the role of family income are 
typically conducted in a policy environment with programs designed to mitigate the effect of 
credit constraints. It is difficult to interpret relationships concerning the role of tuition, or 
family income, without conditioning on changes in the entire policy environment.  
 
B.   Are the Unemployed Credit Constrained? 
Some recent empirical evidence questions the presumption that many of the 
unemployed are credit constrained. Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley (2001a) report 
that consumption responses to transitory income shocks during unemployment spells are 
small. Consumption expenditures by liquidity-constrained households should respond dollar-
for-dollar to transitory income changes. To isolate responses to transitory income changes, 
Gruber uses across-state and over-time variation in unemployment insurance replacement 
rates; Browning and Crossley use legislative changes in the Canadian unemployment 
Insurance system. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Gruber finds that a 
ten percentage point cut in replacement rates (from 60 per cent to 50 per cent, for example) 
would lead to an average fall of 2.5 per cent in food expenditure.   
Browning and Crossley find an even smaller effect in the Canadian Out of 
Employment Panel, with the same benefit cut leading to a fall in total expenditures of less 
than 1 percent. These elasticities are much smaller than dollar-for-dollar.
3  Thus these results 
suggest the possibility that few households are liquidity constrained, even as a member of the 
household experiences an unemployment spell.   
On the other hand, Browning and Crossley (2001b) suggest that credit constraints (or a 
precautionary savings motive) may have much larger impacts on outcomes that are 
traditionally treated as ‘conditioning variables’ in consumption studies. That is, liquidity 
constraints might have a significant impact on large and discrete decisions such as fertility 
and human capital investment, but conditional on family size and educational characteristics, 
households do a good job of smoothing non-durable consumption.   
Our reading of the current evidence is that the extent to which human capital 
investments in general, and retraining by job losers in particular, are constrained by capital 
market failures remains an open and important empirical question.   
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II.   Training in the Canadian Out of Employment Panel 
This section sets the stage for our subsequent analysis by describing the data and the 
institutional environment from which it was drawn. We begin with the latter.   
 
A.   Retraining Programs and Options for the Jobless in Canada, 1995 
Unemployed workers in Canada may enrol in a government sponsored training 
program, subject to a limited number of places, or choose to self-finance training in a program 
of their choice. In the former case, the government pays for explicit training costs and the 
trainees receive UI benefits until their entitlement runs out or they find a new job. In some 
cases the duration of benefits can be extended by participation in sponsored training. Self-
financed trainees also keep their UI benefits, so long as they simultaneously meet the search 
requirement (activity test). Under a so-called “fee-payer option”, self-financed trainees may 
be exempted from having to search for a job (Park, Power, Riddell, and Wong, 1996).   
In 1991, the Canadian government combined training programs previously 
administered by several agencies into the Employability Improvement Program (EIP), to be 
provided under the supervision of Human Resources Development Canada.
4  This program 
provided unemployed workers with various services such as counselling assistance, training 
and work experience, mobility assistance and related services, and income support. The three 
main components of the program were Job Opportunities (JO), Project-based Training (PBT), 
and Purchase of Training (POT).
5   
In 1993-94 approximately 263,000 new training episodes were initiated under the 
three main EIP components. Approximately 80 percent of these were POT participants, PBT 
serving about 15 percent and JO the remaining 5 percent. In that same year, $560 million of 
Consolidated Revenue Funds was spent on the EIP participants, along with $1.1 billion of UI 
Developmental Uses funds. About 60 percent of POT and 46 percent of PBT trainees were UI 
recipients, and the average cost per client was about  $6,300  (Human Resources 
Development Canada 1995).   
Job losers that choose to purchase training themselves could do so from an array of 
private training providers, as well as from community colleges or universities. Almost all 
community colleges and universities in Canada are public institutions, but they charge up-




B.  The Canadian Out of Employment Panel 
The data that form the basis of this study are from the 1995 Canadian Out-of-
Employment Panel Survey (COEP).
6 The individuals in the COEP survey are a representative 
sample of those experiencing a job separation, defined as the issuance of a public record of 
employment (ROE) by the former employer.   
Information was collected by means of telephone interviews; for the 1995 survey each 
respondent was interviewed twice, in approximately the 3rd and 5th quarter after job loss. The 
data include information on the respondent's pre-separation job, first post-separation job, job 
at the date of the interview, job search and training, and the use of UI benefits and Social 
Assistance. The surveys also have detailed information on demographics, household 
composition, household income, household expenditures, household assets and debts, and the 
labor supply of other household members.   
The information on training derived from the first interview pertains to the period in 
the first 3 quarters after job loss. The major strength of our exercise is that the data provide a 
unique opportunity to examine the determinants and impact of training among the 
unemployed, and it is this information that is instructive on the issue of credit constraints, for 
the following reasons.   
First, because observations in the COEP surveys are taken from the universe of those 
who experienced a job separation, there is a large sample covering non-employment spells in 
a given year.
7  As noted above, this is a significant strength with respect to exploring whether 
or not credit constraints impacted on training decisions since it is with the most disadvantaged 
that credit constraints are most likely to show up. If they don’t seem to be present with such a 
group, it is hard to believe that they would matter for other members of the population.   
Second, the COEP data provide information on a wide range of items. Importantly this 
allows us to correlate training take-up with the financial circumstances of households, and 
with cash-on-hand in particular. As well, the sample identifies individuals who paid tuition or 
fees for their training, information that is central to this paper. This virtue does not come 
without a cost, which is that we do not have as much detail about the form of training 
received as we might like, or as much financial information as we might find in a more 
focused survey of household finances.   
  
7 
C.   The Sample  
The full data set has 3898 respondents in the first cohort (separations between January 
and March 1995) and 3996 respondents in the second cohort (separations between April and 
June 1995).  We have limited the sample for analysis in various ways now described.   
First, we explore only those who separated from a full time job into unemployment, 
discarding observations that, while experiencing a job separation, also reported uninterrupted 
employment in a second job (these multiple job holders are about 6 percent of the initial 
sample).   
Second, we limit the analysis to those aged between 25 and 60, in order to minimise 
issues surrounding transitions both from education to work, and from work into retirement. 
This allows a focus on mainstream workforce training choices.   
Third, the data include separations of various types, including permanent and 
temporary layoffs. There is now a large body of research
8 emphasising the differences 
between temporary and permanent layoffs, the latter being defined as those separating with no 
expectation of recall. The difference between permanent and temporary separations is likely 
to be particularly important for the consideration of training decisions. For example, for 
temporary layoffs with certain recall, training may have no opportunity cost in terms of 
forgone search, and no payoff in terms of better job prospects.   For this reason we restrict the 
current analysis to permanent separations.
9   
We also exclude from the sample those who report that they quit to take another job. 
Again it seems reasonable to expect that the incentives for training that face this group are 
markedly different.   
 
D.   Sample Characteristics and Training Incidence  
These selection criteria leave us with a sample of 2041 permanent separations.
10 
Table 1 provides a statistical profile of the individuals in the sample and summarizes the 
incidence of training in the first three quarters after job loss.   
The first column in the table gives the breakdown of our sample into different 
categories.  Our flow sample consists of recent job losers with no expectation of recall, 
excluding voluntary quitters. Therefore their profile does not represent the prime-age 
Canadian workforce in general. For example, younger workers and those with relatively low 
educational attainment are over represented relative to the stock of workers in Canada.   
The precise wording of the question about training incidence was: Did you take any 
training or education for career or employment purposes at any time since your job ended on  
8 
[date]?  Respondents who answered in the affirmative were subsequently asked: Who paid 
for most of the tuition or fees for this training or education? Respondents who replied Self or 
family we classify as “self-financed training”, with all others being classified as “assisted”.
11   
Thus, the distinction is between cases where the training involved an outlay of funds 
by the individual (or their household), from cases where it largely did not. Clearly, this is not  
 
Table 1: Sample Characteristics and Training Incidence 
Training Incidence   Sample 
Fraction Assisted  Self-
financed 
Total 
Overall (n = 2041)      12.8  10.1  22.9 





























































































































































Explanation: The `sample fraction’ column gives the percentage breakdown of the sample by 
each characteristic. So, for example, 64.5% of the sample is male, and the other 35.5% female. 
The `training incidence’ numbers are for the part of the sample having a particular characteristic. 
So, for example, of the men in the sample, 10.9% received primarily assisted training, 8.1% self-
financed training, and the total incidence of training among men was 10.9 + 8.1 = 19.0%.  
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the only way in which the training received by job losers could be classified.  And, of course, 
self-financed training may be highly subsidized, and indeed, much of it occurs at universities 
and community colleges (while these are publicly funded in Canada, they still charge tuition.) 
Nevertheless, we think the distinction between those who had some out-of-pocket expense 
and those that did not to be important, for the following reasons.   
First, and centrally, the selection process into self-financed- and assisted-training, as 
defined, is likely to be very different. As self-financed training involves an (perhaps 
substantial) outlay of funds, the ultimate decision to take-up training (and what training to 
take-up) resides with the individual. Assisted training may be allocated by program 
administrators, or by firm officials, or by union officials. These decision makers presumably 
have different goals to individual job losers. Moreover, individual job losers may face 
constraints, such as credit constraints, that will not be relevant in the allocation of assisted 
training.   
Second, self-financed training might differ from assisted training in terms of intensity, 
duration, topic and provider (some evidence on this is provided below). It may well also be 
that expected rates of return differ. This last might be true if job-losers have information not 
available to program administrators, which could be related to their aptitudes and the type of 
training they are best suited to (a treatment effect). It is also possible that the combination of 
time and money costs means that investments in self-financed training must pass a higher 
expected payoff “hurdle” than does assisted training (a selection effect).
12   
Overall, 22.9 percent of permanent separations receive some training in the next three 
quarters. Of the trainees, almost half are found to self-finance their own training: 10.1 percent 
for self-financed training and 12.8 percent for assisted.   
In contrast to the large number of studies that attempt to estimate the impact of 
government training programs for the disadvantaged or unemployed (see  Lalonde, 1995, for 
a survey), self-financed training by the unemployed has been largely ignored by the literature. 
A striking feature from Table I is the high incidence of self-financed training. The numbers 
suggest that self-financed training may play an important role in adjustments to job loss. 
Where self-financed training is discussed in the literature, it is usually as a nuisance – a 
source of `substitution bias’ that confounds attempts to evaluate government programs (Kane 
and Rouse, 2000; Heckman, Hohmann and Smith, 2000). In this study, on the other hand, 
self-financed training will be of central interest. 
For the young and for those with high levels of formal education, self-financed 
training takes place more often than assisted training. Broadly, training incidence falls with  
10 
age, and this pattern is more pronounced with self-financed training.
13 In contrast, the 
incidence of assisted training is more uniformly spread across ages. One possible explanation 
for the more uniform incidence of assisted training across ages is that governments or 
agencies may be responding to a greater difficulty among older workers in finding new work.   
 
Table 2: Brief Characteristics of Observed Training 
  Assisted Self-Financed 
A. Who Paid? (Most common responses, % of those in each column category. All self-financed 
training was financed by self or family, by definition.) 
Self or Family  0  100 
Government (includes Federal, Provincial and  welfare 
programs) 
53.0 0 
Employer or Union  19.8  0 
B. Where Offered? (Most common responses, % of those in each column category) 
Elementary or High School  6.9  5.8 
College or University  24.1  49.5 
Business or Commercial School  11.5  9.2 
UI or Welfare Office  6.5  1.0 
Place of Work  9.9  2.4 
 
C. Duration and Intensity  
Completed 73%  76% 
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Training incidence rises with education level. This may reflect complementarity 
between previous and further education, liquidity constraints among the less educated, or, in 
the case of assisted training, skimming by program administrators.
14  
Interestingly, the incidence of training is higher among women.
15 Assisted training is 
more common in Ontario and British Columbia than other regions, but there is little regional 
variation in self-financed training.   
Table 2 provides a brief comparison of assisted training and self-financed training. We 
find that self-financed training is typically less intense but of longer duration, than “assisted” 
training (paid for by a government, union or a former employer). Self-financed training is also 
more likely to occur at a community college or university.  Training choices (such as area of 
study) seem to differ between those who self-finance and those who receive public sector 
sponsored training. Using the same data, Chapman, Crossley and Kim, (2003) examine more 
carefully differences in the types of training pursued by those that self-finance and those that 
receive assisted training, as well as differences in the returns those choices generate.
16 The 
focus of this paper is the role of credit constraints in determining training take-up, and it is to 
that issue that we now turn.   
 
III.  Determinants of Training Take-up   
  Our main empirical strategy is to compare the training take-up of recent job losers 
whose households had cash-on-hand (liquid assets) at the time of job loss with that of recent 
job losers whose household did not have cash-on-hand at the time of job loss. By definition, 
household that carry forward positive liquid assets are not liquidity constrained. Households 
without cash-on-hand may or may not be constrained.  This strategy of splitting the sample by 
financial assets, with those with low assets most likely constrained, is borrowed from the 
consumption literature (Zeldes, 1989; McCarthy, 1995; Browning and Crossley, 2001a). We 
begin with simple correlations before turning to a multinomial probit framework for training 
choices in which we can estimate the effect of cash-on-hand on the probabilities of training 
choices while controlling for other characteristics of job seekers and their households.  
 
A. Financial  Resources 
Table 3 examines the incidence of training in our sample by several measures of 
financial resources: home ownership, whether a spouse was present and employed at the time 
of job loss, whether the job loser received a severance payout and, finally, by our measure of 
cash-on-hand: whether the household held any liquid assets at the time of job loss.    
12 
Owner-occupied housing is certainly a major component of wealth for many 
households. However, in a survey of low-income households in Chicago reported by Mayer 
and Jencks (1989), there was a very low correlation between home ownership and the (self-
reported) ability to borrow $500 if it were needed. McCarthy (1995), in a study of 
consumption growth and risk sharing, investigates alternative splits of the Panel Survey of 
Income Dynamics into high and low wealth samples, and concludes that households perceive 
housing wealth as illiquid.  Homeownership may be a poor measure of immediate financial 
resources.    
 
 
Table 3: Incidence of Training by Credit Constraint Indicators 
 
Training Incidence (percent)   Sample 
 Percent  Assisted  Self-financed  Total 
Overall     12.8  10.1  22.9 
By: Employed Spouse 











































Explanation: The `sample fraction’ column gives the percentage breakdown of the sample by 
each characteristic. So, for example, for 52.6% of the sample the household had positive cash-
on-hand at the time of job loss, while for 47.4% of the sample the household had no cash-on-
hand. The `training incidence’ numbers are for the part of the sample having a particular 
characteristic. So, for example, of the respondents whose household had no cash-on-hand, 
13.0% received primarily assisted training, 6.7% self-financed training, and the total 
incidence of training among those without cash-on-hand was 13.0 + 6.7 = 19.7%. `Employed 
Spouse at Job Loss’ refers to whether the respondent had a spouse who was employed at the 
date the respondent lost their job. ‘Own home’ refers to whether the respondent’s household 
owned their home. `Severance payout’ refers to whether the respondent received a severance 
payment associated with the job loss. 
 
 
The Canadian unemployment insurance system treats severance pay as earnings, and 
allocates it as such to the weeks following job loss (at the rate of previous pay). It can 
therefore result in a delay in benefit eligibility.  
Browning and Crossley (2001a) found that the consumption of households without 
cash-on-hand at job loss was responsive to U.I. replacement rates, while the consumption of  
13 
households with cash-on-hand was not. Thus we believe that a lack of cash-on-hand is our 
best marker of potentially credit-constrained households.   
The measure of cash-on-hand that we have is based on the following question: Do you 
or someone in your household have any assets that you could draw on if it was really 
necessary? For example, money in the bank, savings bonds or RRSPs that are cashable, or 
insurance policies, etc. Please do not include fixed assets such as house, cars, boats, etc. As 
mentioned above, we use asset information pertaining to the time of job loss. By this measure, 
53 percent of our sample had cash-on-hand at the time of job loss.
17   
Strikingly, cash-on-hand appears to be highly correlated with self-financed training 
among recent job losers, but not with assisted training. None of the other financial resources 
measures exhibits a strong univariate correlation with training incidence. We turn next to a 
multivariate analysis.     
 
B.   Multinomial Probit Estimates 
To move to a multivariate framework, we estimate discrete choice models of training 
up-take. In particular, we estimate multinomial probit models of a recent job loser’s decision 
to pursue one of three choices: assisted training, self-financed training, or no training. The 
multinomial probit does not impose the independence of irrelevant alternatives; it allows for 
correlation between the unobservable determinants of training choices. 
Our baseline estimates are reported in Table 4. The multinomial probit requires a 
normalization and we have made no training the base choice, so that the coefficients should 
be interpreted as effects on indices determining the probability of each of the other choices 
relative to no training. There are several interesting effects. For example, the probability of 
either type of training (relative to no training) is significantly higher for women and rises with 
past education.   
   However, the key result from Table 4 is that having positive liquid assets at job loss 
(“cash-on-hand”) does not matter for the incidence of assisted training, but strongly 
influences self-financed training. Indeed, cash-on-hand and past post-secondary education are 
the strongest predictors of self-financed training. 
Averaging over the entire sample, these estimates imply that moving from having no 
cash-on-hand to having positive cash-on-hand almost exactly doubles the probability of self-
financed training, but has no effect on the probability of assisted training.  Averaging over 
just those in the sample with no cash-on-hand leads to the same result: moving them to  
14 
positive assets would almost exactly double their probability of self-financed training but 
have no effect on their assisted training probability.
18 
 







+ve liquid assets at job loss     
Male              
Age               
Age squared            
High school               
University/college            
Atlantic  
Quebec         
Prairies          
British Columbia          
Spouse present 
Young children present 
Female x young children 
Unionized in lost job 
Tenure > 1 year in lost job 
Spouse employed at job loss  
  0.0359 [ 0.42]     
-0.3835 [-3.72]     
 0.1279 [ 3.07]     
-0.0016 [-3.05]     
 0.1075 [ 1.05]     
 0.2833 [ 2.49]     
-0.0354 [-0.23]     
-0.2189 [-1.69]     
-0.0991 [-0.82]     
 0.1432 [ 1.09]     
-0.0842 [-0.66]     
 0.1359 [ 1.05]     
-0.0641 [-0.33]     
 0.0558 [ 0.51]     
-0.0923 [-1.00]     
-0.0205 [-0.18] 
 0.3634 [3.74 ]    
-0.3076 [-2.85]    
 0.0464 [ 0.99]    
-0.0008 [-1.40]    
 0.3078 [2.43 ]  
 0.5181 [3.87 ]  
 0.0274 [0.16 ]  
 0.0423 [0.30 ]  
 0.1161 [0.90 ]   
-0.0670 [-0.43]     
-0.1710 [-1.19]    
-0.0840 [-0.56]     
-0.2607 [-1.16]    
 0.1715 [1.48 ]    
-0.0747 [-0.75]     
-0.0485 [-0.37]    
 
Own home 
UI eligible at job loss      
UI in last 2 years 
High unemployment area    
Ln(hourly wage in lost job)              
(Ln(hourly wage in lost job))
2 
Lost job due to layoff            
quit              
Lost job due to dismissal              
Lost job due to illness     
Constant             
-0.1394 [-1.50]    
-0.0173 [-0.17]     
-0.1322 [-1.43]     
-0.1599 [-1.39]     
 1.0565 [ 1.23]    
-0.1944 [-1.17]    
 0.0172 [ 0.14]     
-0.0599 [-0.38]    
-0.2732 [-1.19]     
 0.2744 [ 1.07]     
-4.4115 [-3.14]     
 0.0630 [0.63 ]    
  0.0732 [0.66 ]    
-0.0197 [-0.20]     
-0.0597 [-0.47]    
 0.7452 [0.78 ]    
-0.1564 [-0.84]    
 0.0448 [0.33 ]    
-0.0189 [-0.11]     
 0.2397 [1.13 ]    
 0.3098 [1.11 ]    
-2.9761 [-1.98]     
Rho 0.35 
 
The results support the hypothesis that the selection processes into self-financed and 
assisted training are quite different, and that the major distinction between the two processes 
seems to involve the capacity to pay for the training. In turn this implies that at least some of 




C.   Robustness Checks 
Table 5 reports a number of tests of the robustness of the results presented in Table 4. 
The key result from Table 4 – the effect of cash-on-hand on training probabilities – is 
reproduced in panel A of Table 5.  
Keane (1992) has pointed out that, in the absence of exclusion restrictions, the 
correlation parameters in the multinomial probit are weakly identified. In fact, we estimate the 
multinomial probit by grid searching over the value of the correlation parameter, and 
estimating the other parameters of the model at each fixed value of the correlation parameter. 
The results presented in Table 4 are for the value of the correlation parameter that maximizes 
the likelihood. In Panel B of Table 5 we reproduce the estimates of the key coefficients of 
interest at alternative values of the correlation parameter. The strong effect of cash-on-hand 
on self-financed training (but not on assisted training) is robust to alternative choices here. 
Another possible concern with this analysis is that we have a very rich specification of 
covariates. The first row of Panel C reports the re-estimation of the multinomial probit with a 
more parsimonious specification, controlling only for basic demographics and lagged wages 
(in addition to the key variable of interest, cash-on-hand). This more parsimonious 
specification strengthens the result.  
We have also experimented with alternative specifications of the cash-on-hand 
variable. The second row of Panel C reports the re-estimation of the multinomial probit with 
the cash-on-hand dummy variable set equal to one if the household reported assets equal to 
twice the respondent’s monthly earnings in the lost job (and zero otherwise). This leads to 
very similar results to our base case.  
Panel D considers alternative samples. The first row of panel D reports estimates of 
the multinomial probit on the sample of layoffs only. This leads to results that are very similar 
to our base estimates. We also tried deleting respondents reporting a shorter (1 quarter or less) 
initial spell of unemployment or a short (1 week or less) training episode. The results of these 
experiments are presented in rows two and three, respectively, of Panel D.  Again, the basic 
result is robust to these sample changes. 
Panel D also addresses another concern. It may be the linearity of the indices in the 
discrete choice models. This may lead us to make inappropriate comparisons between groups 
that are very different.  Rubin (1979, 1973) suggests several (necessary but not sufficient) 
criteria for checking the adequacy of controls in an observational study. Here the “treatment” 
group is those with positive cash-on-hand and the control group is those with no cash-on-
hand. Rubin suggests that the average propensity score (predicted probability of treatment,   
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Table 5: Effect of Cash-on-hand - Robustness Checks 
 
Effect of Cash-on-hand (Liquid Assets at Job 
Loss) On Training Choice 
 
Assisted Self-financed 
  Coefficient [z-score]  Coefficient [z-score] 
A. Base Case 
Full specification  
N=1681, rho=0.35, LnL= -1092.3957 
0.0359 [ 0.42]    
 
0.3634 [3.74 ]    
B. Alternative Specification of Unobservables 
1. Rho = -0.25, LnL= -1092.4253  - 0.0309 [ -0.35]     0.3626 [3.74 ]    
2. Rho =  0.0, LnL = -1092.4079  -0.0104  [ -0.12]     0.3622 [3.73 ]    
3. Rho = 0.25, LnL = -1092.3968   0.0164  [ 0.19]     0.3626 [3.73 ]    
4. Rho = 0.5, LnL = -1092.3969   0.0008  [ 0.01]     0.3487 [3.71 ]    
C. Alternative Specifications of Observables 
1. Parsimonious specification: Basic 
Demographics, Cash-on-hand, lagged 
wages. N=1811, rho = 0.0. 
 -0.0367  [-0.45]     0.4044 [4.45 ]    
2. Alternative Cash-on-hand dummy 
variable:  = 1 if cash-on-hand greater than 
2 months wages in lost job. 
N=1465, rho = 0.0. 
-0.0595  [-0.58]  0.3661 [3.51] 
 
D. Alternative Samples 
1. Layoffs only. N=1100, rho=0.0.    0.1399 [ 1.30]      0.4299 [3.48]    
2. Shorter unemployment spells dropped. 
N=1247, rho=0.0. 
-0.0459 [-0.45]  -0.3118 [2.85] 
3. Short training spells dropped. 
N=1603, rho=0.0. 
-0.0747 [-0.79]   0.3245 [3.09] 
4. Common support (of propensity scores 
for positive cash-on-hand) imposed. 
N=1589, rho=0.0. 
-0.0181 [ -0.20]      0.3648 [3.67]    
E. Propensity scores for positive Cash-on-hand 


























conditional on the regression covariates) in the two groups should not be more than 1 standard 
deviation apart and that the ratio of the variances of the propensity scores in the two groups  
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should be close to 1 and not more than 2. Both these conditions are met in this application. 
Moreover, the support of the propensity scores is largely common to the two groups.  
Nevertheless, we also tried imposing common support by a minimal trimming of the 
tails of the two propensity scores distributions and re-estimating the model. The results of this 
exercise are reported in the fourth row of Panel D (Table 5) and are, again, very similar to our 
base results. The last panel (E) of Table 5 reports comparison of propensity scores (estimated 
probabilities of having cash-on-hand, given other characteristics) between the two groups 
(those with and without cash-on-hand).   
To summarize, we find a very robust correlation between cash-on-hand at the time of 
job loss and the decision to pursue self-financed training, even after controlling for a large 
number of observable characteristics. 
 
D.    Additional Survey Evidence 
There is additional survey information on the issue of the role of credit constraints. 
Table 6 summarizes survey responses to a direct question concerning the “main reason for not 
taking training”.     
 
Table 6: Reported Reason for Not Training 
 
Percent of those not Training 
(Percent of full sample) 
  All  No Assets  Positive Assets 
















      
Course desired not available/ offered  3.5     
Don’t know what to take  1.8     
Too late to register / have to wait till next session  1.6     
Not qualified / don’t meet course requirements  1.5     
Was rejected from or refused training  1.2     
Had no baby sitter  0.4     
      
Others 27.0     
      
Total Observations     968  1073 
% not training    80.3  74.2  
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The first column gives a breakdown of the reported main reason that non-trainees did 
not participate in training. The key result is that 11.1 percent of respondents cited “not enough 
money” as their main reason for not having taken training.  The second and third columns of 
the Table split the non-trainees in our sample by cash-on-hand status. Here we find that those 
with no liquid assets at the date of job loss are more than twice as likely to give the “not 
enough money” response.  Thus these qualitative responses support our interpretation of the 
multinomial probit estimates: credit constraints prevent some job losers without cash-on-hand 
from self-financing some desired training.   
 
Table 7: Saving and Dis-saving - First 3 Quarters after Job Loss 
 
No Training  Trained   
Didn’t train for 








68.6 8.5  12.8  10.1 
A. Change in Debts; percent of category.   
Increased 17  27  24  28 
Unchanged 56  45  45  48 
Decreased 28 28 31 25 
 100  100  100  100 
B. Change in Liquid Assets (“Cash-on-hand”); percent of category. 
Decreased 29 38  39  38 
Unchanged 55  53  49  39 
Increased 16 9  12 23 
 100  100  100  100 
Explanation: Reading across, the `Sample percent’ column gives the percentage of the sample 
in each category. For example, 8.5% of the sample did not train for lack of funds, and 12.8% 
received primarily assisted training. Within Panels A and B the columns give the percentage of 
each category whose debts (Panel A) and liquid assets (Panel B) increased, decreased or stayed 
the same, between the job loss and the interview (about 3 quarters later). For example, of those 
who did not train for lack of funds, 38% reported a decrease in liquid assets, 53% reported no 
change in their household’s liquid assets, and 9% reported an increase in their household’s 
liquid assets (Panel B, Column 2). Columns may not add exactly due to rounding error. 
 
Of course, there is always some question as to the veracity of self-reported reasons for 
action or inaction. The fact that it was largely those who did not have cash-on-hand at the 
time of job loss are more likely to report that they did not train because a lack of financial 
resources lends credibility to the responses.  Another way we can check this is to examine 
changes in the financial resources of the respondents. For example, if those who reported that 
they did not train because of a lack of financial resources appeared to be saving (accumulating  
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financial resources), that would undermine their claim. Table 7 reports a check on  this by 
breaking down four groups (those that self-financed training, those that received assisted 
training, those did not train for lack of funds, and those that did not train for any other reason) 
by changes in their liquid asset (cash-on-hand) and debt positions between the job loss and the 
time of the first interview.
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  The most striking result in Table 7 is that those who did not train because of 
insufficient funds were very unlikely (relative to the other groups) to report an increase in 
liquid assets. This lends additional credence to their claim of constrained circumstances.  If 
they were accumulating financial assets, it would be more difficult to believe that their 
training choices were constrained. 
 
E. Discussion 
Of course, the levels of liquid assets we observe in our data are not randomly 
allocated. It is possible therefore that liquid asset levels reflect some unobserved 
characteristics of individuals or households that are in turn correlated with their human capital 
choices. Discount rate heterogeneity is not an obvious explanation because, with perfect 
capital markets, agents, regardless of their time preference, should maximize the present value 
of income streams, and then use capital markets to implement the desired timing of 
consumption. However, several heterogeneity based explanations do come to mind. For 
example, it is possible that both cash-on-hand and human capital choices reflect heterogeneity 
in the returns to education. That is, those with higher than average returns to education may 
have had higher pre-job-loss wages, which in part they saved, and may also be more likely to 
make further investments in education. A related story has those with more prior education 
having higher incomes, and higher savings. If, in addition, past education is complementary to 
post-job-loss training, this could also generate the observed correlations. 
While data from an observational study may never be conclusive about causal effects, 
there are several features of our data that render the above stories unlikely as explanations for 
the observed correlation between cash-on-hand and self-financed training.    
One is that the richness of our data allows us to control for worker heterogeneity in 
important ways. For example, we control for past wages and prior education in an attempt to 
eliminate those explanations based on heterogeneity in the returns to education or on 
complementarity between past education and post-job-loss training. Because we are 
examining older individuals with educational and labor market histories, we can use past  
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outcomes to control for the same kinds of long run factors that Carneiro and Heckman (2002) 
and Cameron and Heckman (1999, 2001) capture with test scores.  
A second feature of our data is that we were able to examine, in addition to the 
quantitative information on liquid assets and training, qualitative responses pertaining to the 
reason for not training. There is a group of non-trainees who report that a lack of funds 
prevented them from not training, and these are by and large the same individuals who had no 
cash-on-hand. The most obvious interpretation of these qualitative responses is that credit 
constraints preclude some human capital investments among recent job losers.       
The final and perhaps most important feature of our data in this regard is the contrast 
between self-financed and assisted training. Explanations for the correlation between cash-on-
hand and training based on heterogeneity in, for example, returns to education, predict that we 
should also observe a correlation between cash-on-hand and assisted training. That is, 
respondents in this study could not be compelled to take assisted training, and so only those 
with high returns to education should agree to take it. If (even after controlling for past wages 
and education), cash-on-hand is capturing heterogeneity in rates of return, it should predict 
assisted training and not just self-financed investments. (This assumes that assisted training 
has some cost, such as an opportunity cost in time or potential forgone earnings, and that 
returns to assisted and self-financed training are correlated across individuals, as seems 
likely). However, cash-on-hand does not predict assisted training in our multivariate models. 
This loose specification test increases our confidence in the adequacy of our controls.  
On balance then, it appears that the COEP data provides evidence that supports the 
view that credit constraints limit the human capital investments of one disadvantaged group: 
recent job-losers. Arguably this evidence of a role for credit constraints in human capital 
choices is stronger than much of the “indirect” evidence for other groups reviewed earlier. 
These indications of credit constraints among job-losers are complementary to the analyses of 
consumption reported by Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley (2001a).    
From a policy point of view, an interesting question is how much additional training 
might be induced by the elimination of credit constraints. Recall (from Table 1) that among 
permanent layoffs 12.8 percent receive assisted training and 10.1 percent self-financed 
training. The numbers in Table 6 indicate that adequate financial resources, made available, 
for example, by a voucher program, could perhaps almost double the number of people who 
chose to train in the program of their choice. If the 11.1 per cent of those who didn’t train that 
subsequently reported lack of funds as the main reason were instead able to self-finance  
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training, this could raise the rate of self-financed training to [10.1 + 11.1*(1-0.229)] = 18.7 
percent. This would be a substantially higher level of training among recent job losers.    
However, it is equally important to note that the elimination of credit constraints 
would not lead to universal training. Related to this is that “not enough money” is not the 
most common reason for not training. For both those with and without cash-on-hand, the most 
common reason for not training is the belief that the respondent “doesn't need it”, or that it 
“won't change job prospects”. Even among those without liquid assets more than twice as 
many respondents give this response as give the credit constraint response.    
Rationing of assisted training seems to be even less of a constraint. That is, 5.2 percent 
of our sample report having been refused training at some time since the job separation. Of 
course this could be refusal for many reasons, including inadequate qualifications, but the 
data reveal that the largest fraction of these were turned down by a Canadian Employment 
Centre (the Unemployment Insurance system, which allocated most publicly sponsored 
training in the period covered by our data). However, of these, some received assisted training 
and some self-financed training. Table 6 reveals that of those that did not train, only 1.2 
percent report that rejection or refusal from training was the primary reason.    
 
IV. Conclusion 
While there is a large literature on the evaluation of government sponsored training 
programs for the unemployed, much less is known about who seeks out and receives training. 
In particular, we have little information about training among the unemployed that is financed 
by the individual or his or her household. In light of the current interest in voucher and loan 
programs, in tax favored training “accounts” and in other schemes intended to encourage 
private training and retraining activity, this is an important gap in the literature. This paper 
goes some way towards filling that void.     
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Our reading of the evidence from the COEP is that proponents of training schemes 
involving an element of worker choice (that is, vouchers, loans or tax favored savings 
accounts) should find the results modestly encouraging. There does seem to be evidence that 
credit constraints pose an impediment to training and retraining after job loss and that an 
important proportion, but by no means all of, the unemployed are credit constrained.  At least 
for this particular disadvantaged group, the COEP data provides evidence that is strongly 
supportive of the view that credit constraints limit human capital investments.  
This evidence of a role for credit constraints in human capital choices reported here is 
more compelling than the indirect evidence often cited for other groups, such as correlations 
between family income and college choices. Of course, evidence of credit constraints among 
recent job losers does not imply that the human capital investments of other groups are 
similarly constrained. Nevertheless, it may be useful if additional analyses of the role of credit 
constraints in limiting human capital investments are focused, as this one has been, on groups 
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1  Examples include “Learn$ave” in Canada (http://www.srdc.org/english/projects/learnsave.htm); “Individual 
Learning Accounts” in the United Kingdom (http://www.dfes.gov.uk/ila/); and “Ticket to Work” in the United 
States (http://www.ssa.gov/work/Ticket/ticket.html).  
2 For theoretical explanations of credit constraints see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Kehoe and Levine (1993). 
For additional empirical work on credit constraints see for example Zeldes (1989), Jappelli (1990) and Gross and 
Souleles (2002).  
3 In the Browning and Crossley study the implied reduction in expenditures due to a one dollar cut in benefits is 
less than seven cents at the means of the data. For households holding liquid assets prior to job loss, they find no 
response whatsoever in expenditures. The largest replacement rate effect is found for those respondents whom 
one would expect to be most vulnerable: those with families whose spouse has no labor force attachment, and 
those with no liquid assets at job loss. Even for this group, which represents about 9 percent of the sample, a 
dollar cut in benefits leads to a fall in total expenditures of only 25 cents.  
4 The description of the program in this subsection is based on HRDC (1995).  
5 JO are subsidized job and training opportunities with private employers, serving UI non-eligibles. PBT  is job 
and training opportunities with public projects. POT is training in a classroom setting. PBT and POT serve both 
UI eligibles and non-eligibles. Average training duration was 24 weeks for JO, 24.2 weeks for PBT, and 15.3 
weeks for POT.  
6 The COEP surveys were developed by Human Resources Development Canada in an attempt to understand the 
consequences of the legislative changes made to the Canadian UI system. The 1995 COEP was conducted by 
Statistics Canada. Further details are available at http://www.statcan.ca/English/IPS/Data/72M0001XCB.htm.  
7 This is not the case with better known panels such as the PSID and NLSY, which are representative of a 
population of individuals rather than a population of job terminations. In these latter surveys it is often necessary 
to pool data from many years to generate a sufficient sample of unemployment spells (see for example Gruber 
(1997)).  
8  See Feldstein (1975, 1976), Corak (1996) and Katz and Meyer (1990).  
9  The distinction is made on the basis of respondent’s’ expectations concerning the question: At the time your 
job ended on [date], did you expect to return to work for the employee?  
10 Because of item non-response and missing covariates, our analysis often reflects slightly smaller samples.  
11 These include the responses UI or federal government, Welfare program, Provincial government, Employer, 
Union and Other.  
12 Of course, if assisted training is highly rationed, and program administrators seek to maximize rates of return, 
it is possible that assisted training is more highly selected, and has thus provided better returns.  
13 This is consistent with human capital theory, younger workers having a longer prospective career in which to 
recoup an investment in training.  
14  We do not believe that the self-financed training in our sample reflects students engaged in part-time or 
summer work. First, respondents who reported “return to school” as their reason for separating from a job were 
treated as out of scope in the survey. Second, the separations that led to inclusion in the sample occurred in the 
first half of the year (and not, for example, in August or September). Thirdly, we restricted the sample to 
individuals 25 and older.   
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15 The literature on sponsored training suggests that if it does have a payoff, it is for mature women.  
16 Briefly, Chapman, Crossley and Kim find that even after controlling for a rich set of individual characteristics, 
self-financing trainees do appear to choose different kinds of training. Self-financing trainees may also realize 
larger impacts on their subsequent earnings. The difference, while economically large (about 7 percent) is not 
statistically significant.  
17 Morissette (2002) reports that in Canadian Survey of Financial Security (a cross- sectional and representative 
survey of Canadian households) about two thirds of those households that experienced some unemployment in 
the previous year reported some financial wealth. Financial wealth in that study is a broader concept than our 
cash-on-hand measure, and includes real assets such as boats and cars.  
18 These marginal effects were calculated by predicting the probability of different training choices for each 
individual in the sample at both their actual value of the cash-on-hand variable (0 or1) and at the counterfactual 
value. Differences in probabilities were calculated for each individual, and then these differences were averaged, 
over the whole sample and over the subsample that had no cash-on-hand at job loss.  
19 Debts are based on the question: Apart from cars or mortgage, do you and your household have any other 
debts? Please think of all sources such as loans and credit cards. 
 